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COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY 
AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 
John B. Davis 
In this paper I develop a heterodox economics account of ho'W individuals 
influence institutions and social values. In contemporary economics there 
are t'Wo opposed 'Ways of characterizing this influence. Mainstream eco-
nomics treats institutions and social values as the products of atomistic 
individual activity, meaning that 'When individuals act, they act free of 
any significant social attachments. In contrast, heterodox economics treats 
institutions and social values as the product of socially embedded individ-
ual activity, meaning that 'When individuals act, they act socially or as 
members of various kinds of groups. The atomistic vie'W has dominated 
economics for a half century or more. Thus, to make sense of this differ-
ence from a heterodox perspective, 'We need to sho'W ho'W individuals in 
groups act differently from groups of atomistic individuals, or ho'W indi-
viduals acting in an organized 'Way behave differently from unorganized 
collections of individuals. I understand the difference to be essentially a 
matter of explaining ho'W individuals acting in groups have "shared" 
intentions about the groups of 'Which they are members. 
This distinction bet'Ween "shared" intentions and ordinary individual 
intentions may seem relatively straightforvvard in everyday language, since 
people use "'We" language in an intentional manner 'When they focus on their 
membership in groups ("'What 'We 'Want," "'What our department decided," 
"'What the community has chosen to do," etc.), and use "I" language 'When 
they see themselves as acting independently of others (u'What I 'Want," "'What 
I believe," etc.). Yet, until recently the philosophical explanation of intention-
ality has been almost entirely associated 'With the explanation of individual 
intentions associated 'With the use of "I" language. Moreover. proponents of 
individualist explanations in the social sciences and especially in economics 
argue that it makes no sense to ascribe intentions to groups of individuals, 
because only individuals can have intentions. For them, our ordinary 'Ways 
of speaking are at best an ill-founded expedient, and a proper analysis of 
"'We" language should reduce such expressions to sets of "I" expressions. 
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Here, Illy strategy is to develop an account of "shared" intention that 
ans"Wers these objections by dra"Wing on a Illore recent philosophical liter-
ature on the subject of collective intentionality. In this literature, "When "We 
speak of individuals as being socially eIllbedded, "We Inean that they have 
we-intentions, that is, intentions that they attribute - and believe that 
others attribute - to the group of "Which they are IlleIllbers. Though these 
"We-intentions are often said to be "shared" in this literature, caution 
needs to be sho"Wn in using this terIll. Collective intentionality analysis is 
non-holistic, Ineaning that only individuals have intentions, not groups. 
Individuals attribute intentions to the groups of "Which they are IlleInbers, 
and participate in this attribution by using ""We" language. In this sense 
"We-intentions are shared. But this does not iIllply that a group has an 
intention over and above the intentions of the individuals that Illake it up. 
We-intentions are individually expressed intentions, though of a special 
kind in Illaking the group rather than the individual their subject. In "What 
follo"Ws, then, only individuals exist in regard to intentional expression. 
The issue then beCOIlles "Whether the relationships bet"Ween individuals 
expressing "We-intentions are cOInpatible "With characterizing individuals 
atoInistically, or "Whether individuals' use of ""We" language requires that 
"We characterize individuals as being socially eInbedded. 
This issue, ho"Wever, cannot be kept separate froIn another. As I "Will 
argue, the Inost iInportant consequence of treating individuals as being 
socially eIllbedded in groups is that their behavior can no longer be 
explained solely in instruInentally rational tenllS. That is, "When individu-
als are seen to be socially eInbedded in groups, the requireInents upon 
theIn as IlleInbers of those groups dictate that their behavior be explained 
as "What I label a deontologically rational behavior or as "principled" rational 
behavior. Thus, if a collective intentionality analysis of individuals' use of 
""We" language iInplies that individuals cannot be conceived of atoIllisti-
cally, but IllUSt be thought to be socially embedded in groups, then it also 
implies that their behavior needs to be reconceptualized as "Well, "With 
instrumental rationality taking a back seat to a deontologically rational or 
"principled" rational type of behavior. 
In this chapter, I thus address the question of ho"W individuals influence 
institutions and social values in terInS of a conception of the individual as 
socially eInbedded, explaining this conception in terInS of "We-intentions, 
and dra"Wing out the iInplications all this has for ho"W"We understand indi-
vidual behavior. Section 1 introduces the concept of collective intentional-
ity, relying on the thinking of the leading contributor to the subject, Finnish 
philosopher, RaiIno TuoIllela. Section 2 applies the collective intentionality 
concept to the agency-structure Inodel as dra"Wn froIn Tony La"Wson (1997) 
to explain ho"W individuals socially embedded in groups can be thought to 
influence institutions and social values through their ability to forIn 
"We-intentions. Section 3 addresses ho"W our understanding of individual 
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econoITlic behavior needs to be revised to include deontologically or 
"principled" rational behavior vvhen vve consider the socially eITlbedded 
individuaL Section 4 briefly COITlITlents on individuals' capacity to fonn 
vve-intentions in terITlS of the idea of seeing things froITl others' points of 
vievv, and then sUITlITlarizes the arguITlent of the paper. 
1. Collective intentionality and individuals' influence on 
institutions and social values 
Until recently, analytic philosophers have explained the concept of 
intentionality - the idea that ITlental states have an "aboutness" to them -
in terITlS of the actions and intentions of individuals (e.g. Anscombe 1963; 
Davidson 1980).1 Having an intention involves settling on a course of 
action, either by deciding to act in some vvay or even by simply excluding 
considerations that favor alternative courses of action. Having an inten-
tion involves forming a cOITlITlitment to action, and intentional action only 
occurs vvhen an agent aiITls to bring sOITlething about by acting in a pur-
posive vvay. But if a collection of individuals perforITls some set of actions 
as a group or teaITl, and each individual acts intentionally, does this mean 
that the group acts intentionally as vvell, settling on a group course of 
action and making a comITlitment to action as a group? 
In the atoITlist tradition, individuals form intentions and act, groups do 
not. Individuals may act as meITlbers of groups, but they still fonn their 
intentions individually, because only individual ITlinds exist. Thus Hayek 
held that supra-individual entities such as groups, classes, etc. should be 
thought of as theoretical concepts rather than real things (e.g. Hayek 1955), 
and Arrovv's assertion that "society" "is just a convenient label for the 
totality of individuals" (Arrovv 1984: 80). FroITl their perspective, because 
all intentionality is individual, collective intentionality ITlust be a theoret-
ical concept rather than a really existing thing. The alternative is to iITlag-
ine SOITle fanciful sort of Hegelian super-mind floating above and about 
individual ITlinds. Yet, the dileITlma this poses is a false one. We can say 
that all ITlentallife occurs vvithin individual minds, but this does not iITlply 
that all intentions are individual and must be expressed in first person sin-
gular terITls. It is not incoherent for an individual to refer to a group of 
vvhich that individual is a meITlber, and say, "vve intend," or to use first 
person plural expressions in a variety of circumstances to indicate vvhat 
a group's intentions might be. Nor does the use of "vve-intentions" pre-
suppose the existence of any sort of super-ITlind or other "type of supra-
individual entity. Indeed, since "vve-intentions" language is as common in 
everyday life as "I intentions" language, there is every reason to investi-
gate the implications of collective intentionality for econoITlic behavior. 
In the current philosophical literature on the subject, collective inten-
tionality and vve-intentions are explained as a structure of reciprocal 
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attitudes shared by individuals. The ITluin contributions ITluy be found in 
BratITlan (1993; 1999), Gilbert (1989), Searle (1990; 1995), TuoITlela and 
Miller (1988) and TuoITlela (1991; 1995). In the discussion that follo"\",'5 I 
rely on TuoITlela's "\Vork, "\Vhich is the ITlost extensive and "\VeIl-developed. 
TuoITlela's analysis is conservative, in that though it sOITletiITles ITlakes ref-
erence to intentions as being shared, this is not ITleant to iITlply that there 
is any actual sharing of intentions, beliefs, desires, or other "\Ve-intentions 
by individuals using "we" language. Rather, a we-intention is an individ-
ual's attribution of an intention to a group that the individual believes 
is reciprocally held by other individuals in that saITle group. Indeed, an 
individual may have a "\Ve-intention that no other individuals actually 
have if that individual is mistaken about others having that "\Ve-intention. 
Thus, a we-intention is not a supra-individual group intention separate 
frOITl the attributions of individuals. Rather, a "\Ve-intention is an individ-
ual's expression of a group intention based on a sense of there being like 
attributions on the part of others in the group to which the individual 
belongs. Thus, the expression "the intentions of the group" is really short-
hand for a set of individual "\Ve-intentions on the part of a collection of 
individuals in the group. 
T"\Vo characteristics of we-intentions are accordingly emphasized in 
TuoITlela's analysis. First, the individual expressing a "\Ve-intention 
believes that this intention is widely if not universally held by other 
group meITlbers, and secondly, the individual believes this intention is 
mutually held by meITlbers of the group. (In the limiting case above both 
of these beliefs are mistaken.) Consider the case in "\Vhich an individual's 
we-intention is rooted in an attitude ("fear") that the individual believes 
group ITleITlbers also attribute to the group. For an individual A who is a 
meITlber of a group G, "A "\Ve-fears that X if A fears that X and believes 
that it is feared in G that X and that it is mutually believed in G that X is 
feared in G" (Tuomela 1995: 38). On this basis A might suppose that G 
has SOITle intention reflecting the fear of X. This "\Ve-intention "\Vould have 
the saITle structure as the attitude A ascribes to the group. Of course, A 
can only surITlise that others in G have the saITle fear and that the fear of 
X is ITlutually believed by ITleITlbers of the group. Ideally, the idea that X 
is "ITlutually believed" "\Vould involve saying that the fear that X is 
believed by everyone, but TuoInela allo"\Vs that "mutual" can have strong 
and "\Veak interpretations, because groups theInselves have strong and 
weak criteria for supposing their ITleITlbers share a belief, attitude, or 
intention. The main point is that "\Ve-attitudes are a group attitude, not in 
the sense that a group apart froIn its ITleITlbers has an attitude to"\Vards 
something, but in the sense that individuals "generally" in a group have 
SOITle such attitude expressible in ""\Ve" terITls. Thus, saying that they 
"generally" have a "\Ve-attitude depends not just on the ITlutual belief 
condition, but on both conditions, "\Vhich if cOITlbined, provide us "\Vith 
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reason to suppose that individual members of a group are justified in 
saying "\-Vhat they (n"\-Ve N ) intend.2 
Note that this very basic understanding of collective intentionality 
already takes us some "\-Vay to"\-Vards understanding ho"\-V individuals can 
be thought to influence institutions and social values. From an atomist 
point of vie"\-V, the main difficulty in understanding ho"\-V individual behav-
ior influences institutions and social values lies in sho"\-Ving ho"\-V some-: 
thing fundamentally individual in nature gets translated into something 
that is fundamentally social in nature. Thus, game theory accounts that 
attempt to explain ho"\-V social conventions and institutions emerge from 
the choices of atomistic individuals are either forced to rely on ad hoc 
assumptions not explainable in terms of individual choice to get the job 
done, or they simply fail to get the job done (cf. Hargreaves Heap and 
Varoufakis 1995; Rizvi 1994). In contrast, "\-Vhen"\-Ve suppose that individu-
als are socially embedded in groups and form "\-Ve-intentions about those 
groups' activities, "\-Ve have already assumed that individuals are engaged 
in social activity_ Institutions and social values are products of social activ-
ity. What Tuomela's analysis adds to this basic idea is an explanation of 
social activity in terms of structures of reciprocally related "\-Ve-intentions 
possessing a mutually reinforcing character. These structures of interac-
tion, as it "\-Vere, function as the skeletons of social activity and therefore of 
the institutions and social values that are the products of social activity. 
Thus, change and evolution in structures of "\-Ve-intentions in groups bring 
about change and evolution in institutions and social values, and individ-
uals influence institutions and social values as they continually form ne"\-V 
and different "\-Ve-intentions about the groups of "\-Vhich they are members. 
Tuomela's analysis also provides a basis for distinguishing ho"\-V indi-
viduals influence institutions as compared to ho"\-V they influence social 
values. Using his distinction bet"\-Veen rules and norms, "\-Ve-attitudes and 
"\-Ve-intentions associated "\-Vith rules underlie institutions, and "\-Ve-atti-
tudes associated "\-Vith norms underlie social values. With rules, an explicit 
or implicit agreement brought into existence by some authority deter-
mines a distribution of tasks and activities to individuals. Rules rrtay be 
formal and "\-Vritten, such as la"\-Vs, statutes, regulations, charters, by-Ia"\-Vs, 
etc., or they may be informal agreements bet"\-Veen individuals, sometillles 
orally established and sOllletillles silently agreed to. With norlllS, lllutual 
beliefs substitute for actual agreelllents bet"\-Veen individuals in deterlllin-
ing distributions of tasks and activities across individuals. As "\-Vith 
"\-Ve-intentions generally, mutual beliefs are beliefs reciprocally established 
behveen individuals, such that each believes that others have the sallle 
belief, and each also believes that others think the sallle about the others, 
and so on in a structure of reinforcing, mutually held beliefs. 
Rules and norms are both understood to have lllotivational force, mean-
ing that they constitute reasons for action on the part of the individuals 
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who accept them. Indeed, rules and norms are typically framed as 
"ought" principles, and impose requirements on individuals as members 
of groups in the form of specific prescriptions for individual action. 
Formally, individual A feels obliged to do X, because A is a member of the 
group with a we-intention representable in terms of a rule or norm to the 
effect, "-w-e believe members of the group should do X." But rules and 
norms are different in virtue of the different means by -w-hich they enforce 
a distribution of tasks and activities among individuals (Tuomela 1995: 
22-24). The prescriptive force of rules derives from there being sanctions 
that apply, -w-hether formal/legal or informal, to those individuals -w-ho do 
not observe them. In contrast to rules, sanctioning -w-ith norms takes the 
form of approval or disapproval on the part of others. Because norms are 
internalized by individuals in that they themselves accept them as rea-
sons for acting, individuals apply others' potential disapproval to them-
selves, as -w-hen feeling shame or embarrassment. 
In Tuomela's collective intentionality analysis, then, rules are the basis 
for institutions, and norms are the basis for social values. While it is true 
that many institutions also involve norms, as relatively settled social 
arrangements institutions generally place greater reliance on rules. Social 
values, in contrast, are rarely rooted in agreements, even informally, and 
thus place little -w-eight on rules. Rather, social values reflect systems of 
mutual belief about individuals' interaction -w-ith one another. Thus, -w-hen 
individuals create and/ or change institutions, they adopt ne-w- rules, and 
produce new -w-e-attitudes that define group action -w-ithin an institutional 
frame-w-ork characterizable in terms of agreements and corresponding 
sanctions. When individuals develop and/ or influence social values, they 
adopt new norms, and produce ne-w- -w-e-attitudes that define group action 
within a social value frame-w-ork based on their mutual beliefs and sys-
tems of (dis)approvaL In both fraUle-w-orks, rules/ institutions and norms/ 
social values, we-intentions are the foundation for understanding group 
action. Individuals thus influence institutions and social values as mem-
bers of groups, and group action is the interUlediate link bet-w-een indi-
vidual action and supra-individual institutions and social values Ulissing 
froUl mainstream. accounts of individuals' influence on institutions and 
social values. 
To complete this picture, -w-e need to briefly consider ho-w- rules and 
norms create obligations for individuals in terms of ho-w- different tasks, 
rights, and positions apply to different individuals in groups. Tuomela 
characterizes an individual's position within a particular group in terms of 
that individual's tasks and rights -w-ithin that group. An individual's tasks 
and rights are then further distinguished according to -w-hether they flo-w-
from rules or norUlS operating -w-ithin the group, that is, -w-hether they are 
rule-based tasks and rights or norm-based tasks and rights. Across 
groups, individuals' social positions are understood in terms of the -w-hole 
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array of actions individuals are required and permitted to do across various 
economic settings. These social positions assign individuals a variety of 
different tasks vvhose performance is, in each instance, protected by 
rights, vvhere these tasks-rights combinations may themselves exist 
vvithin established modes of implementation that are also understood in 
tasks-rights terms. The overall framevvork thus explains individual rights 
and duties vvithin and across groups in terms of tasks-rights pairs that 
ultimately have vve-attitudes in groups as their foundation. Individuals 
influence institutions and social values by acting vvithin this framevvork. 
2. The agency-structure Illodel -w-ith collective intentionality 
I focus on the agency-structure model, first, because it describes human 
agency as an °embedded intentional causality" and human rationality as a 
situated rationality (Lavvson 1997: 63, 187), and, second, because it 
describes not only hovv individuals are influenced by institutions and 
social values, but also hovv they influence institutions and social values. A 
precursory formulation of the model is Anthony Giddens' influential 
"structuration theory," vvhich treats individuals and social structures as 
interdependent, or as a duality, such that each may be said to help consti-
tute the other, especially through recurrent social practices (1976; 1984). 
Roy Bhaskar (1979 [1989]) and Margaret Archer (1995) revised and 
extended Giddens' thinking, principally by seeing reality as stratified and 
multi-layered vvith emergent properties differentiating one layer or level 
frolTI another (cf. Hodgson 2000: 5-13; also Collier 1994). Lavvson devel-
oped this latter, critical realist conception of the agency-structure rela-
tionship specifically for economics in Part III of his Economics and Reality 
(1997), and used it primarily to critique the rnethodological posture of 
mainstream economics. An important aspect of Lavvson's analysis is that 
individuals engage in routinized forms of activity, rely on tacit knovvledge 
and skills, and observe rules, norrns and conventions. What, then, does 
the concept of collective or group intentionality add to this account? 
In the first place, the concept of collective intentionality permits us to 
develop a more concrete understanding of individuals' ernbeddedness 
and situated rationality in terms of the vvays in vvhich groups of individ-
uals are organized. Groups, in virtue of their complexity, are organized so 
as to assign povver and responsibility differently to individuals in differ-
ent positions, yet, in virtue of their having "shared" intentions, still in a 
manner that airns at consistency in overall action across these assign-
ITlents. Focusing on individuals' involveITlent in groups allovvs us to 
explain vvhy individuals engage in particular types of routinized activity, 
vvhat particular tacit knovvledge and skills they need to rely upon, and 
vvhat particular rules, norITlS, and conventions they need to observe based 
on the vvay that the group as a vvhole organizes a set of positions in a 
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relatively coherent structure. Simply referring to individuals' reliance on 
routines, tacit abilities, and so forth fails to account for vvhy different indi-
viduals act in different vvays, and therefore, ultimately, hovv changes in 
the vvays that individuals act in concert vvith one another influences insti-
tutions and social values. Individuals act in the vvays that they do, 
because they occupy particular positions in groups organized in terms of 
collections of positions (cf. Lavvson 1997: 163 ff). 
But more is involved than simply adding nevv detail to our analysis of 
individual embeddedness and to the account of the influence of individ-
uals on institutions and social values. When individuals act under ratio-
nales involving vve-intentions, groups become agents over and above the 
collection of individuals that make them up. Individuals' actions still 
have effects, but specifically as a particular pattern of effects that can be 
identified as the effects that the group has as a distinguishable agent in its 
ovvn right. Tuomela's account of collective intentionality, in explaining 
collective intentionality and "shared" intention as a structure of individ-
ual intentions, at once combines the causal effectivity of individual action 
vvith the fact of individuals' organization in groups to justify treating 
groups as cohesive, single agents. Thus the fact that individuals follovv 
routines, adopt norms, etc. is not just evidence that human agency 
involves an "embedded intentional causality" and a situated rationality, but 
it is evidence that individuals influence institutions and social values by 
vvay of the group structures in vvhich individuals are embedded. 
But one point needs clarification. We savv above that mainstream eco-
nomics lacks an account of hovv groups mediate betvveen individuals and 
institutions and social values, and that this tends to produce a reliance 
on ad hoc assumptions in efforts to explain hovv individuals influence 
institutions and social values. Given that such explanations enjoy limited 
success at best, it does not corne as a surprise that the language of "unin-
tended consequences" strongly underlies 'mainstream economics' 
accounts of the relation of individuals to institutions and social values. 
But this reliance should not be thought to imply that, vvhen vve turn to col-
lective intentionality analysis of groups, that institutions and social values 
are fully intended consequences of the activities of individuals in groups. 
In the first place, in the agency-structure lllodel, structure, or institutions 
and social values also influence individuals (just as they are influenced by 
individuals), and this causal process lllakes the evolution and develop-
ment of institutions and social values an open-ended process vvith unin-
tended consequences. But there are other reasons specific to the operation 
of groups vvhich lead us to the sallle conclusion. 
First, the nUlllber and variety of kinds of groups vvhich exist in human 
society is truly staggering, ranging from lllore tightly organized groups 
such as firllls, governments, and households (March and Simon 1956) 
to more loosely formed ones such as social movements or even just tvvo 
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individuals "going for a vvalk together" (Gilbert 1989). Indeed, if vve add 
to groups in this ITlore "objective" rule-governed sense all those collec-
tions of individuals vvho constitute groups in the ITlore "subjective" sense 
of adhering to shared social values, then the nUITlber of groups is even 
larger. Second, ITleITlbership in and across groups is obviously cross-cutting, 
overlapping, and often conflicting. Add to this the fact that meITlbership 
in groups is continually changing, and vve have further reason to expect 
considerable "unintended consequences" in our analysis. Third, groups 
hovvever defined, do not make up the entire universe of economic agents. 
Individual action that is relatively autonomous (if not atomistic) also con-
tributes to the evolution of institutions and social values. For these rea-
sons, the activity of groups of individuals ought only be said to influence 
rather than fully explain or deterITline the evolution of institutions and 
social values. 
What general methodological strategy does the collective intentionality 
account of individuals as socially embedded thus add to the agency-
structure rnodel? First, vve begin by surveying and identifying particular 
groups of individuals acting as econornic agents, vvhere the selection 
of those groups that are of interest to us is driven by our current cause-
and-effect concerns presented to us in the form of "vvhy" questions 
regarding the vvay things happen in the econornic vvorld (Runde 1998). 
Second, our characterization of these groups involves our explaining their 
position-task-right structures, vvhich accounts for their internal organiza-
tion and their capacity to coherently organize the different activities of 
different individuals. Third, vve atternpt to explain interaction betvveen 
groups, vvhere this involves institutions or social values vvith across-
group rules and norms. This broader fraITlevvork is no less a domain of 
collective intentionality, though it stretches the idea of a group to think of 
institutions and social values being groups. 
3. A revised view- of individual econolllic behavior 
I novv turn to vvhy our understanding of individual economic behavior 
needs to be revised vvhen vve rnake use of the concept of collective inten-
tionality. The behavior of atomistic individuals is understood in instru-
rnentally rational terms, because individual objective functions are defined 
solely in tenns of individuals' ovvn preferences. With no basis for action 
other than their ovvn preferences, and assurning that they do not act out of 
habit or behave irrationally, atolllistic individuals can do nothing other 
than attelllpt to realize their ovvn preferences as efficiently as possible. 
When vve treat individuals as socially ernbedded, hovvever, vve can no 
longer say that individuals act only on their ovvn preferences, because 
socially ernbedded individuals generally act in accordance vvith those 
rules and norITlS associated vvith their membership in groups. These rules 
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and norms, vve savv, function as "ought" principles or social requirements, 
and as such generally lead socially embedded individuals to behave in 
vv-ays different from the vvays that atomistic individuals behave. It is this 
emphasis on "ought" principles and the social requirements of group 
membership, then, that is at odds vv-ith explaining the behavior of socially 
embedded individuals in instrumentally rational terms, and suggests that 
socially embedded individuals are fundamentally different from atom-
istic individuals. 
Those vv-ho defend the atomistic conception of the individual and instru-
mental rationality vvould likely first reject these arguments for the follovv-
ing reason. Explaining individual behavior in terms of group requirements 
is ultimately equivalent to explaining individual behavior as instrumen-
tally rational though novv subject to constraints additional to those usually 
assumed in standard constrained 'optimization analysis, namely;. con-
straints associated vvith observing the rules and norms of group member-
ship. These additional "social" constraints further narrovv individuals' 
choice sets, but individuals still ought to be thought to maximize their 
preferences vvithin this additionally delimited space. Even socially embed-
ded individuals, that is, ultirnately behave in an instrumentally rational 
fashion, and it thus follovvs that socially embedded individuals are not dif-
ferent in any substantive sense from atomistic individuals. 
This response, hovvever, overlooks vv-hat is different about individual 
behavior in groups in vvhich individuals express vve-intentions. On the 
understanding developed by Tuomela and others, since vve-intentions are 
the intentions of individuals and not the intentions of groups, vv-hatever 
these intentions irnply in the vvay of individual behavior - say, that one 
ought to observe group rules and norms - must be thought of as having 
been intended by the individuals vvho have them. That is, intentional 
behavior, vv-hatever its nature, reflects vvhat the individual chooses to do, 
not vvhat the individual is limited to doing. In the language of mainstream 
rationality theory;. vve-intentions derive from individuals' objective func-
tions no less than do those individual intentions standard theory vvould 
associate vvith individuals acting on ovvn preferences. Thus, acting in 
accordance vvith rules and norms is not evidence of acting under an addi-
tional set of constraints ("social" constraints). And since rules and norms 
impose requirements on individuals, supposing vve-intentions derive 
from socially embedded individuals' objective functions, it gives us good 
reason to think individual behavior cannot be explained in instrumentally 
rational terms. 
But might not defenders of the atomistic conception of the individual 
and instrumental rationality use this reply for one further defense of the 
standard conception? If vve-intentions enter individuals' objective func-
tion, they might argue, then they must be produced by vve-preferences, 
just as ordinary individual intentions are produced by ovvn preferences 
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(or I-preferences). If this is so, thus tnight not the behavior of socially 
ell1.bedded individuals still be explained in instrutnentally rational terITls? 
Indeed w-e-preferences have recently been analyzed along these lines by 
Robert Sugden in the fortn of teall1. preferences (Sugden 2000). Sugden 
explicitly rejects collective intentionality analysis as carried out by 
TuoITlela and others, precisely because it introduces the idea that individ-
uals are bound by social obligations (or group requireITlents) w-hich he 
regards as being inconsistent w-ith an account of instruInentally rational 
behavior. To preserve the latter, then, the forIner has to go. This, in turn, 
w-ould itnply that rules and norInS are things teaITlS prefer to observe 
rather than believe their ITleInbers are cOITlpelled to observe. Moreover, if 
this is all true, then it is hard to see w-hy, w-ith a teaITl preferences analysis 
of rules and norInS, individuals should be treated as socially etnbedded. 
If their w-e-intentions derive froITl w-e-preferences, and consequently 
itnpose no obligations or requiretnents upon theITl, it seeInS that their rela-
tionship to others is incidental to their behavior. Indeed, Sudgen effec-
tively takes this position w-hen he argues that the "existence" question 
regarding w-hether teatns and other groups exist is independent of the 
theory of (instruITlental) rationality enlarged to include w-e-preferences. In 
the final analysis, Sugden's view- is that the conception of the individual 
as an atoITlistic being is sufficient for any discussion of w-e-preferences, 
w-e-intentions, and action in accord w-ith rules and norITls. 
Clearly, Sugden's analysis turns on the idea that w-e-preferences do not 
iITlpose "ought" principles or social requireITlents upon individuals. Why 
is it, then, that Tuoll1.ela and other proponents of collective intentionality 
see this as an essential diITlension of w-e-intentions? The answ-er lies in 
their specific understanding of w-e-intentions. Individual w-e-intentions 
are w-hat individuals think are the intentions of individuals in a group 
generally. They are not w-hat individuals think ought to be the intentions 
of the group, nor are they the intentions of the group from any individ-
ual's ow-n particular point of view-. Since successfully expressing w-e-
intentions requires that an individual believe that other individuals have 
that saIne w-e-intention and also believe that this w-e-intention is tnutually 
believed, an individual's expression of a w-e-intention basically involves 
the individual's best guess regarding a structure of intentions on the part 
of different individuals regarding w-hat they all think everyone else 
believes is the intention of the group. But this ITleans that there is a ten-
sion of SOIne kind w-ithin the individual betw-een this best guess view- and 
w-hatever ITlight be this individual's ow-n view- of w-hat the group intends. 
This tension is a product of the fact that one does not use "w-e" language 
properly unless one ll1.akes a best effort to get at w-hat everyone else 
means in using "w-e." In effect, an individual using "w-e" language ITlust 
Inake a cOInInitment to a group's view- of its intentions irrespective of 
w-hether the individual personally agrees about this use of "'w-e." For this 
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reason, using ""\Ve" language and expressing "\Ve-intentions in the collective 
intentionality sense imposes obligations on individuals associated "\Vith 
standing by "\Vhatever the group's intention involves. Moreover, an obli-
gation in this sense is not just something that binds an individual, but also 
a binding that the individual embraces. One only feels a genuine obliga-
tion, that is, "\Vhen one has embraced that obligation oneself. 
Sugden's treatment of "\Ve-preferences as preferences of instrumentally 
rational atomistic individuals consequently does not really get at "\Vhat is 
involved in "\Ve-intentions. We-intentions do not derive from "\Ve-preferences, 
but rather from individual commitment to a use of ""\Ve" language that 
(self-) imposes obligations on the individual. But atomistic individuals do 
not act out of any such sense of obligation but only on the basis of "\Vhat 
they prefer. Moreover, in Sugden's "\Ve-preference analysis, the individ-
ual's relation to others is an incidental one. We-preferences are held in 
essentially the same "\Vay by all team members, and there is no difference 
bet"\Veen the "\Vay "\Ve-preferences properly represent the team and the "\Vay 
an individual might understand the team's "\Ve-preferences. In contrast, 
"\Ve-intentions require the individual's commitment to the use of a shared 
"\Ve-Ianguage that goes beyond individual perspective. This, and the obli-
gation it brings, socially embeds the individual in the group, and brings 
about a non-incidental relationship bet"\Veen the individual and others. 
As said above, acting out of a sense of obligation or the requirements 
upon oneself may be characterized as being deontologically rational 
rather than instrumentally rational. Philosophers have traditionally seen 
the difference as being a matter of doing "\Vhat one thinks one ought to do 
as opposed to doing "\Vhat one "\Vants to do. This may "\VeIl suggest that 
vvhat is meant here is that being deontologically rational is equivalent to 
acting morally, and that, therefore, the behavior of SOcially embedded 
individuals needs to be explained in terms of the categories of ethics. It 
is true that philosophers of ethics have used the term "deontology" to 
refer to a particular (non-consequentialist) approach to moral behavior. 
But clearly, many, if not most, of the obligations and requirements that 
groups impose upon individuals have little to do "\Vith acting morally. 
The term "ought," of course, is also used in a non-normative, pragmatic 
sense. It is this sense of the term that I generally mean to refer to vvhen I 
characterize socially embedded individuals as acting in a deontologically 
rational "\Vay. Indeed, the second expression used above to characterize 
acting out of a sense of obligation or in terms of group requirements -
acting in a "principled" rational "\Vay - is probably the better one to 
employ. Individual action in groups is guided by a variety of principles, 
vvhose observance can be thought rational in a broad sense. For example, 
accepting the tasks assigned to one in an agreed-upon division of labor 
"\Vould be thought by most people to involve acting on a rational princi-
ple. Nor vvould it be said that a principle of this nature has any special 
22 
COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 
moral content. Such principles simply constitute "Working principles in 
the operation of many groups. I thus characterize their observation by 
individuals as a "principled" type of rational behavior, and leave it to 
another occasion to investigate the extent to "Which such behavior also 
raises questions of ITlorality. 
My general argument, it should also be emphasized, is not that socially 
embedded individuals behave only in a "principled" rational fashion. 
Individuals "Who express "We-intentions and are members of groups 
clearly also have their o"Wn preferences, and may seek to realize them in 
an instrumentally rational manner, either "When they find themselves at 
odds "With "What is expected of them in groups, or even "When they see 
themselves as acting in conformity "With "\.Yhat the group expects of them. 
Indeed, in the organization of many groups, individuals are expected to 
act in an instruInentally rational "Way in order to best fulfill the require-
ments of group IneInbership. Consider an employee in a business 
assigned a set of rule and norIn-based tasks associated "With doing a par-
ticular job. If one rule is to invoice customers by the end of the Inonth, and 
the norIn for ho"\.Y this is to be done is to include in the invoice a complete 
description of all purchases made by those customers, the individual 
assigned these tasks is likely still free to perform them in a variety of "Ways 
(inquire as to customer satisfaction, pursue follo"W-up orders, institute 
ne"W record-keeping practices, etc.). Ho"W "Well individuals do their 
assigned jobs, then, can be a Inatter of the extent to "Which they also act on 
their o"\.Yn preferences regarding the "\.Yay a job is best done. They conse-
quently act in an instrumentally rational "\.Yay "When already behaving in a 
"principled" rational manner. 
Individuals, it thus seeInS fair to say, engage in both instrumentally 
rational and "principled" rational kinds of behavior, and that the balance 
or mix of these depends upon the circumstances and the setting. 
Abstractly, one might begin by imagining a spectrum. At one extreme, 
there exists a set of activities in "Which individuals operate free of signifi-
cant group attachments, and can be described as behaving solely in an 
instrumentally rational manner. This is the case that mainstream econo-
Inists have treated as universal. At the opposite extreme, there exists a set 
of activities in "\.Yhich individuals act solely according to the dictates of the 
group, and their behavior is fully explained by group membership. 
Heterodox economists have on occasion seen this as the universal case 
(for example, in some Marxist accounts "When class is said to deterITIine 
individual behavior). But bet"Ween these t"Wo extremes lies a variety of 
activities and "What is probably the great majority of types of economic 
behavior. This behavior is complex in involving both instrumentally 
rational and "principled" rational behavior in some overall structure, and 
developing explanations of this large range of cases seems to be a matter 
of explaining ho"\.Y these t"Wo fonTIs are integrated and organized "With 
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respect to one another.3 My vie'-V is that explaining these types of cases 
should be the first goal of economists trying to describe individual behavior. 
4. The capacity to express -w-e-intentions; sUlllIDary 
I close "'With a brief discussion of "'Why '-Ve should suppose that individuals 
are socially embedded in the sense of having a capacity to form "'We-
intentions. The capacity to express "'We-intentions is a capacity to remove 
oneself· from one's o"'Wn particular case and circumstances, and adopt a 
point of vie"'W held by others. When an individual uses u"\Ve" language cor-
rectly, that individual successfully grasps ho"\V a structure of "\Ve-attitudes 
on the part of individuals in a group justifies that individual saying "\Vhat 
the group's intentions are. The closest mainstream economists corne to 
this sort of explanation is in their treatment of sympathy as a possible 
argument in the atomistic individual's o'-Vn objective function. 
Individuals "\Vho are sympathetic to"'Wards others are sometimes said to be 
"altruistic" in haVing preferences regarding others' "\VeIl-being. But this 
conception involves an understanding of altruism at odds "'With '-Vhat lllost 
people associate "'With the concept, since the "good" acts that these "altru-
istic" individuals engage in are only undertaken because they raise these 
individuals' o"'Wn utility. Most people, rather, see altruistic behavior as a 
kind of selfless behavior. SYITIpathy explained in this "\Vay does not really 
involve individuals removing themselves from their o"'Wn circumstances, 
or becoming selfless. It consequently does not get at '-Vhat is involved in 
being able to express "'We-intentions '-Vhich take individuals beyond their 
o"'Wn cases. 
One "'Way of explaining this capacity to remove oneself from one's o"'Wn 
particular case and circuITIstances lies in terms of Philippe Fontaine's 
recent treatment of the concept of eITIpathy in early and later history of 
economics (Fontaine 1997; 2001). Fontaine distinguishes bet"'Ween sylllpa-
thy and eITIpathy, "'Where sympathy is having an o"'Wn preference regard-
ing another's '-VeIl-being, and empathy involves imagining oneself being 
in the place of another. If one is empathetic to"'Wards another person, one 
someho"'W grasps "'What the other's situation involves (an imagined trans-
position of places), and then acts in one's o"'Wn capacity "'With that under-
standing in mind. Empathetic individuals, ho"'Wever, need not have other 
individuals' "'Well-being in mind '-Vhen they act. They ITIay simply regis-
ter ho"'W others look at the "'World, in order to make better decisions on 
their 0"'Wn.4 But empathy, in the sense of imagining another's circum-
stances, "'Would also aIlo"'W for altruistic behavior in the strong sense, in 
that one could behave sympathetically to"'Ward another having grasped 
"'What the other's situation involved. Thus, Fontaine distinguishes 
bet"'Ween imagining oneself in the place of others by intellectually appre-
ciating their circumstances as compared to imagining oneself in the place 
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of others by embracing their feelings and attitudes. That latter transposi-
tion could give rise to altruistic behavior vvhen one vvas sympathetic 
tovvard those feelings and attitudes, though of course it could also give 
rise to quite the opposite type of behavior vvere those feelings and atti-
tudes not thought admirable. 
Fontaine's account of hovv individuals may remove themselves from 
their ovvn circumstances is quite like the capacity Tuomela and others 
interested in collective intentionality attribute to individuals vvho have 
vve-intentions. There is a difference, hovvever. Fontaine's transposition of 
places involves an individual imagining the situation of another individ-
ual. But the capacity to fonn vve-intentions is ITlore abstract than this. 
When individuals successfully express vve-intentions, they grasp hovv a 
reciprocal use of U vve" language, backed up by a mutual belief condition 
across ITlany individuals, entitles theITl to say vvhat a group's intentions 
are. Thus, the business of reITloving oneself from one's ovvn circuITlstances 
is less a ITlatter of seeing things from SOITleone else's point of vievv, and 
rather more a matter of grasping hovv a structure of vve-intentions 
emerges across ITlany individuals. Nonetheless, there is a clear point of 
contact betvveen the tvvo conceptions. While collective intentionality 
analysis attributes a capacity to individuals to grasp a structure of vve-
intentions vvithin a group, being able to do this could be argued to pre-
suppose that individuals are able to place themselves in the shoes of one 
individual after another in a group to produce that sense of vvhat the 
structure of vve-intentions in the group is. That is, individuals arguably 
engage in a saITlpling of other's vievvs, removing themselves froITl their 
ovvn individual circumstances in doing so, as they develop an under-
standing of the correct use of U vve" language in the group. Fontaine's indi-
vidual-to-individual transposition of places analysis, then, might be 
thought to underlie collective intentionality's assumption of a capacity on 
the part of individuals to form vve-intentions. 
To summarize, vvhat the discussion in this paper atteITlpts to do is pro-
vide an account of individuals as socially embedded so as to be able to 
explain hovv individuals influence the developITlent and evolution of 
institutions and social values. Individuals are characterized as being 
socially embedded vvhen they are members of groups in vvhich u vve" lan-
guage is used. Collective intentionality analysis, as recently developed in 
philosophy, is employed to explain individuals' use of U vve" language, 
and then this conception of the socially embedded economic agent is 
introduced into agency-structure thinking about hovv individuals and 
institutions/ social values influence one another. A key implication of the 
discussion is that individual behavior cannot he understood solely in 
instrumentally rational terms, but needs to be enlarged and ITlodified to 
accommodate individuals' deontologically rational or "principled" 
rational behavior in groups. Whether or not such behavior actually 
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occurs, and thus ~hether individuals can indeed be characterized as 
socially eInbedded, ultiInately depends on ~hether one believes individ-
uals can forIn ~e-intentions in the sense explained here. That they do 
have this capacity is suggested by the idea that individuals can iInagine 
and place the In selves in one another's places. 
Notes 
1 The analytic conception follo'Ws an earlier continental philosophy understand-
ing of intentionality that began 'With the 'Work of Franz Brentano, and 'Was fur-
ther developed in the phenomenological 'Work of Edrnund HusserI. My focus 
on the literature from analytic philosophy is rnotivated by this tradition's 
emphasis on the conditions of individuality. 
2 Tuomela dravvs on an account of rnutual belief that has becorne fairly standard 
arnong philosophers vvhich relies on the idea of a hierarchical set of beliefs iter-
ated across individuals (Tuornela 1995: 41ff). See Le'Wis (1969: 52ff) for a parallel 
account in terrns of comrnon kno'Wledge that has played a role in game theory. 
3 For one exarnple of hovv such an explanation rnight be produced, see Minkler 
(1999), 'Where a "cornmitment function" is added to a standard utility function 
representation of individual behavior. The individual is said to engage in a tvvo-
step iterative procedure 'With the first step corresponding to a response to group 
requirernents and the second step corresponding to an instrurnentally rational 
maxirnization of utility. 
4 I use this understanding of empathy in rny discussion of Keynes's treatment of 
investrnent in the stock rnarket as like a ne'Wspaper beauty contest (Davis 1994: 
130ff). 
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